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Abstract—Software defined networking implements the net-
work control plane in an external entity, rather than in each
individual device as in conventional networks. This architectural
difference implies a different design for control functions neces-
sary for essential network properties, e.g., loop prevention and
link redundancy. We explore how such differences redefine the
security weaknesses in the SDN control plane and provide a
framework for comparative analysis which focuses on essential
network properties required by typical production networks.
This enables analysis of how these properties are delivered by
the control planes of SDN and conventional networks, and to
compare security risks and mitigations. Despite the architectural
difference, we find similar, but not identical, exposures in control
plane security if both network paradigms provide the same
network properties and are analyzed under the same threat
model. However, defenses vary; SDN cannot depend on edge
based filtering to protect its control plane, while this is arguably
the primary defense in conventional networks. Our concrete
security analysis suggests that a distributed SDN architecture
that supports fault tolerance and consistency checks is important
for SDN control plane security. Our analysis methodology may
be of independent interest for future security analysis of SDN
and conventional networks.
Index Terms—Network security, SDN security, Control plane
security, OpenFlow security
I. INTRODUCTION
Software-Defined Networking is a relatively new network
architecture in which the control plane is separated from
each individual network device and instead implemented in
an external software entity. The external entity has complete
knowledge of the topology of a network under its control,
and programs the forwarding tables of each individual device
in the network. In contrast in conventional networks (CNs),
the control plane, including implementation of e.g., a routing
protocol such as Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) [1], runs
inside each network device to learn forwarding tables in a
distributed fashion. SDN architectures have two distinguishing
properties of direct interest herein [2]:
1) Control and data plane separation. Removing the
control plane from network devices and implementing it
in an external SDN controller significantly reduces the
complexity of network devices, making them simpler
and cheaper than CN devices whose distributed control
plane functionality is implemented across millions of
lines of code, defined across hundreds of RFCs.
2) Network programmability. An SDN controller, with
complete knowledge of a network’s topology, controls
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a multitude of network devices within its administrative
domain. By providing application programming inter-
faces (APIs), SDN makes it possible to develop net-
working applications, e.g., traffic engineering [3], thus
enabling network innovation. In contrast, CN devices are
proprietary and closed, making it hard or impossible to
develop innovative network applications.
The concept of SDN has evolved since the term was
originally coined in 2009 [4]. Here we try to clarify the critical
properties of SDN from the perspective of network devices.
A network device can be pure SDN, non-SDN, or hybrid.
A pure SDN device implements no control function and is
fully controlled by an external SDN controller. A non-SDN
device implements all of its own control functions and is not
controlled by any SDN controller. A hybrid SDN device both
implements control functions, and is controlled by an SDN
controller. Based on this classification of network devices, a
network can also be one of three types. A pure SDN network
consists of at least one SDN controller and network devices
all of which are fully controlled by the controller. A non-
SDN network (i.e., CN) consists of network devices all of
which implement and run their own control functions with
no controlling external entity. A hybrid network consists of
hybrid devices and at least one SDN controller.
In academic work, “SDN" often implies a pure SDN net-
work, such as an OpenFlow network, and many academic
SDN security research papers (e.g., [5]) focus primarily on the
security of OpenFlow networks. SDN controllers originating in
academic work, such as FloodLight and NOX, also primarily
support OpenFlow and control OpenFlow switches which
implement no control functionality (i.e., are pure SDN, rather
than hybrid).
In contrast in industry, SDN commonly refers to hybrid
networks consisting primarily of CN devices, augmented with
open interfaces also allowing external control by an SDN
controller. For example Broadcom, a leading provider of
switch chips, published OpenFlow Data Plane Abstraction
(OF-DPA) software [6] to allow switches based on Broad-
com chips to be controlled by OpenFlow. Note those CN
devices, although often claimed to support OpenFlow and
which can be controlled using the OpenFlow protocol, do
not actually implement OpenFlow tables and are not true
OpenFlow switches. Rather, they use conventional tables such
as L3 tables and Access Control Lists (ACLs) to emulate
the behavior of OpenFlow tables, which allows packets to be
processed beyond destination addresses. As another example,
OpenDayLight [7] and ONOS [8], two leading open source
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2SDN controllers, can control not only OpenFlow switches but
also conventional devices, e.g., using NETCONF [9]. It is clear
that industrial network practitioners focus more on network
programmability than on the separation of control and data
planes. We refrain from speculating on which type of SDN is
better, or is the future.
We study and compare the control plane security of a pure
SDN (hereafter referred to as SDN) and a CN. While hybrid
networks are more popular in the field, there is no clear
consensus on how to best divide control functions locally
inside a device and externally into a controller. Further, by
studying the security of both SDN and CNs, we hope that
security threats identified in each can be selectively applied to
a given hybrid network when its local and external controls
are well defined.
Research on the security of SDN and CNs is in two
distinct states. On one hand, the security of CNs has received
less academic attention but is well understood by network
security practitioners; aside from the area of routing (e.g.,
BGP security [10]) there are relatively few academic papers
on the control plane security of a CN, security threats are
well understood by equipment vendors and many security
mitigations are built into CN products (e.g., switches, routers).
In contrast, SDN security has received considerable academic
attention (e.g., [11], [12], [13]), but its progress is considered
slow (at best) by industrial measures. For example, neither of
the two leading open source SDN controllers, OpenDaylight
and ONOS, has implemented significant security mitigation.
These different states of SDN and CN security research have
attracted little attention. We offer the following explanation.
We observe that many papers on SDN security assume a sim-
ple network, ignoring practical properties such as redundancy
and scalability essential to realistic networks—thus excluding
security risks faced by important network control functionality.
Further, security threats identified for SDN are not properly
compared with those in CN. We suggest that the lack of
academic scrutiny, particularly systematization literature, on
CN security, may be a significant contributing factor in the
considerable academic research on SDN security having failed
to have major impact in industry.
We aim to address the gap by a comparative security
assessment of conventional and SDN networks. Rather than
a security analysis of all aspects, we focus on control plane
security, since it is in their control plane architecture that CNs
and SDN differ primarily.
We provide a framework consisting of essential network
properties required by production networks. Using this, we
study how those properties are achieved by SDN and CN
respectively, and analyze the security risks and mitigations
accordingly. Our finding is that the security threats faced by
SDN and CN are comparable in an apples-to-apples compar-
ison, i.e., if despite the architectural differences between the
two types of networks, they are tasked to provide the same
network properties under the same threat model. However,
defenses vary in that filtering in the network edge is effective
in CN, but less so in SDN. Further, consistency checks, which
are required by both networks to defeat inside attacks, can
be implemented inside each CN device, but require a highly
modularized SDN software architecture to facilitate imple-
mentation there. Our finding is supported by detailed security
analysis. We argue that our methodology for comparative
analysis will be of independent interest, to guide future SDN
security analysis in both academia and by practitioners.
The sequel is organized as follows. Section II provides back-
ground information on CN and SDN architecture. Section III
outlines fundamental network properties required by typical
production networks, as well as the threat model used for our
analysis. Sections IV and V analyze the security risks of the
control plane of conventional Layer-2 (L2) and Layer-3 (L3)
networks respectively. Section VI analyzes security risks in
SDN networks. We compare the security risks and mitigation
of SDN with CN in Section VII. Section VIII reviews related
work. Section IX concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
Here we provide background on conventional and SDN
networks for consistent terminology and later reference. Net-
working experts may advance to Section III.
A. Conventional Networks
A CN can be L2 or L3. A network consisting of only L2
switches as its intermediate systems is called an L2 network.
Two (or more) L2 networks can be connected, e.g., using an
L3 router. A network of L3 routers is called an L3 network.
Other than using different types of destination addresses for
forwarding, L2 and L3 networks differ mainly in two aspects:
1) They use different mechanisms in constructing their
forwarding tables. L2 devices learn their forwarding
tables (i.e., MAC tables) from the data plane. L3 routers
build routing tables from the control plane using routing
protocols. Note: MAC tables map MAC addresses to
switch ports, not to be confused with ARP tables which
map IP addresses to MAC addresses.
2) They handle unknown packets differently. An unknown
packet is a packet without any corresponding forwarding
rules. An L2 device floods an unknown packet to all
ports except the receiving one to learn the forwarding
rule, while an L3 router drops an unknown packet (and
may also notify the packet source, e.g., using ICMP).
Due to these differences, L2 and L3 networks face different
sets of security risks. Thus, we divide CN into L2 and L3, and
discuss separately in Sections IV and V.
B. Software Defined Networking
SDN involves one or more SDN controllers, each control-
ling a number of network elements within its domain via
standard protocols (such as OpenFlow). Each controller may
run in multiple instances, each further managing a subset of
network elements and backing-up other instances to provide
both scalability and high availability. SDN controller instances
also communicate with each other within the same domain, or
may be federated with controllers in other domains, e.g., to
form a complete view of the network (see Fig. 1). Further,
3Fig. 1: Generic SDN architecture
there may be a hierarchy of SDN controllers for scalability or
multiple layer control.
An SDN controller usually provides a web based portal
and APIs for network operators and applications to control
network elements respectively. The interfaces between SDN
controller and network elements are labelled southbound,
and those between SDN controller and SDN applications are
northbound.
Scope of our Analysis: An SDN controller is an entity
that does not exist in a CN, thus its security requires special
attention. As noted earlier, we focus on control plane security
herein; this area has not received much attention [11], motivat-
ing us to consider it and herein give a framework for directly
comparing control plane security issues with those facing CNs.
We see analysis of control plane security as an important step
contributing to a broad security analysis of SDN, which should
include all SDN components (see Fig.1).
III. FRAMEWORK
Our framework consists of a set of properties required
by typical production networks, and two threat models (see
below) to be applied to both SDN and CNs.
A. Network Properties
Production networks must provide properties such as loop
free forwarding to allow entities attached to the network to
communicate. Here we outline five primary such properties.
While these are not specifically related to security, they are
important in security analysis as each may require its own
control functions and introduce unique security risks. Since
multiple properties may be provided by a common control
protocol, each property does not necessarily introduce new
security risks.
• Basic Forwarding. A network consisting of a single
switch must establish forwarding information to allow
attached entities to communicate.
• Loop Free Forwarding. A network consisting of mul-
tiple devices and links which form physical loops must
ensure there is no forwarding loop among network device
forwarding tables.
• Link Redundancy. If there are multiple links between
a pair of network devices, the network topology should
remain unchanged in the event that one or several of such
links go down as long as there is one functioning link
between the pair. Further, it should be possible to use all
links to transmit data, instead of only one.
• Device Redundancy. This property is often referred to
as high availability. A network consisting of two or more
devices should remain fully available in the event of the
failure of any single device.
• Scalability. As a network grows and becomes large, it
should remain functional and manageable. Network de-
sign should allow growth without significant management
overhead.
Besides these properties, networks typically must provide
other properties such as QoS and certain services to address
user needs. For example, a carrier network may need to
support virtual private networks (VPN) [14] to its customers,
e.g., using MPLS. Control protocols required to provide those
network services usually introduce their own security risks.
However, discussion of such control protocols is beyond our
present scope.
B. Threat Models
We consider two threat models: END-HOST, where only end
hosts are assumed vulnerable to compromise or under attacker
control, and ALL-ELEMENT, where all network elements are
assumed vulnerable. Under the END-HOST threat model, SDN
controllers and the network devices themselves are considered
trustworthy but end hosts attached to the network are not.
In contrast, neither SDN controllers nor network devices are
considered trustworthy under the ALL-ELEMENT threat model;
in other words, attacks could be from hosts, as well as network
devices and SDN controllers. We use these two threat models
in Section VII to compare the security risks and defenses of
SDN and CN.
IV. L2 NETWORKS
We now discuss how L2 networks satisfy the network
properties of our framework, and analyze security risks and
mitigations associated with each property.
A. Basic Forwarding
To provide network connectivity, an L2 device uses MAC
learning to build its MAC table, which maps switch ports to
MAC addresses, and possibly other information such as VLAN
tags. When a switch receives a frame from one of its physical
ports, it adds a new (or updates an existing) entry in the
MAC table mapping the frame’s source MAC address to the
receiving port. Multiple MAC addresses can be associated with
a same port number. To forward a frame, a switch looks up its
destination MAC address in the table, and forwards the frame
through the corresponding port. If no entry is found, the switch
floods the frame to all ports except the receiving one. The
intended destination, upon receiving the flooded frame, sends
a response frame enabling the switch to learn the mapping
between receiving port and responding source MAC address.
The missing mapping entry is added into the table for future
use. Figure 2 illustrates a MAC table for a single switch.
4Port # MAC
1 A
2 B
3 C
Fig. 2: MAC table for switch with three devices connected.
1) Attacks: An L2 MAC table is learned from data plane
(including end-user) packets. Thus, it is subject to MAC
attacks [15]. A malicious host can send a packet with a
falsified source MAC address to poison a switch’s MAC table.
Two known attack strategies are as follows. In MAC spoofing,
an attacker sends frames with spoofed source MAC addresses
matching those of target (victim) hosts, thereby hijacking
traffic destined to those victims. If a victim is actively sending
packets to switches, the poisoned MAC table will alternate
between correct and falsified states. A more effective attack,
MAC Flooding, sends a large number of garbage frames with
randomly generated source and destination MAC addresses
to fill up the MAC table. Once the table is full with non-
existent MAC addresses, legitimate frames will not match any
forwarding entry, resulting in flooding of frames to switch
ports including those connecting to the attacker who can thus
eavesdrop or even hijack virtually all traffic. Any device,
including end-user devices (outsiders) and network devices
(insiders), can similarly manipulate a MAC table.
Note that this differs from ARP spoofing (Section V-A1).
MAC attacks poison the MAC table of a switch using any
packet with a spoofed source MAC address. ARP spoofing
poisons the ARP table of a host or router using only ARP-
related packets (e.g., ARP response or gratuitous ARP [16]).
2) Defenses: MAC attacks can be mitigated by preventing
untrusted devices such as hosts from sending packets with
spoofed MAC addresses. One such mitigation mechanism,
port security [17], allows a switch to bind a port to one or
several MAC addresses (MAC binding). Port security usually
also allows limits on the number of MAC addresses to be
associated with a switch port (MAC limiting). MAC bind-
ing can prevent MAC spoofing, but is static and typically
requires manual configuration—possibly introducing configu-
ration overhead and misconfigurations. MAC limiting appears
more practical as it can mitigate MAC flooding attacks and
requires only simple configuration, but alone, does not prevent
MAC spoofing.
B. Loop Free Forwarding
In L2 networks with multiple switches and looping links
(see Fig. 3), forwarding loops can occur when unknown L2
frames are flooded and no Ethernet frame TTL field limits how
many times a frame is forwarded. Thus for loop prevention, an
L2 control protocol like the Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) [18]
is needed. Switch ports connecting other switches and end user
hosts are often referred to as Network-to-Network Interfaces
(NNIs) and User-to-Network Interfaces (UNIs) respectively.
In STP, switches exchange Bridge Protocol Data Units
(BPDUs) carrying information about switch identifiers and
Fig. 3: Operation of the spanning tree protocol.
path costs, and accordingly compute a spanning tree. A root
switch is first elected, typically that with the smallest identifier.
Each non-root switch then determines the root port as the port
with least-cost path leading to the root switch. Similarly, for
each link in the network, the end port closer to the least-
cost path is called the designated port. All remaining ports
are called blocked ports. A spanning tree then consists of all
the network switches (one as root) and some network links.
The links not in the spanning tree are still used to exchange
control plane traffic (e.g., BPDU) but only in one direction to
be loop-free.
1) Attacks: STP uses BPDU, with a multicast destination
MAC address, to exchange topology information to elect a
root bridge and to establish a spanning tree, assuming all
BPDUs are trustworthy. Due to the lack of security protection
(e.g., no default robust authentication [19]), STP is subject to
BPDU spoofing attacks [20], as well as BDPU tampering and
BDPU flooding. For example, an attacker could send a spoofed
BPDU packet with a low priority and small MAC address
to result in the lowest bridge identifier among all switches,
thus winning the root bridge election. Being the root bridge,
the attacker receives virtually all network traffic within the
STP domain. BDPU tampering could lead to the calculation
of incorrect network topology. BDPU flooding could force
switches to continuously re-calculate topology, resulting in
service disruption.
2) Defenses: An administrator may intervene in root place-
ment, e.g., manually specifying the location of the root switch;
Cisco’s root guard command [21] facilitates this. Likewise,
BPDU filter prevents a host from participating in STP by
filtering BPDUs in NNIs.
C. Link Redundancy
While STP can prevent forwarding loops, it uses a single
link between a pair of switches even when redundant links
exist, resulting in underutilized network bandwidth or even
packet loss in the event of link failures. To improve band-
width usage and redundancy, L2 protocols may support link
aggregation, grouping multiple links into one virtual link. A
Link Aggregation Group (or LAG), viewed as a single link,
can be included in a spanning tree, allowing their collective
use for link protection and load balancing.
Link aggregation can be configured manually, or estab-
lished dynamically by the Link Aggregation Control Protocol
(LACP) [22]. LACP transmits LACP Data Unit (LACPDU)
to inform the other end (partner) of its state and its under-
standing of partner state. Based on LACPDU, a LAG can be
dynamically created and updated.
51) Attacks: A switch running LACP sends to, and receives
from its partner, LACPDUs to maintain link aggregation.
LACPDUs are typically sent over a point-to-point link, making
man-in-the-middle tampering difficult, but remaining vulner-
able to LACP spoofing attacks because (1) LACP is usually
implemented in the CPU (vs. data plane), allowing a switch
to receive LACPDUs from remote entities; and (2) it has no
security protection (e.g., peer authentication) [22]. Thus, an
external entity (e.g., a host) may send forged LACPDUs to a
switch to influence the state of its link aggregation, e.g., to
cause link instability or even denial of service.
2) Defenses: Implementing LACP in the data plane may
ensure that LACPDUs are only received from a given port and
never leave that port, mitigating forged LACPDU injection.
D. Device Redundancy
Device level redundancy ensures that the failure of one or
more devices does not result in loss of network connectivity;
e.g., Cisco Switch Stacking (CSS) [23] allows a number of
switches, usually of the same model, to form a redundancy
group. Within a redundancy group, a master is elected dynam-
ically, e.g., based on bridge identifiers and/or priority values.
If a master fails, a new master is elected to ensure ongoing
network connectivity.
1) Attacks: Electing a switch master by dynamic election
is subject to election spoofing attacks. An adversary may send
falsified messages to become the master.
2) Defenses: The election process should use cryptographic
methods for origin authentication and message integrity to
exclude unauthorized entities, e.g., a host, from joining.
Switches within a redundancy group should be connected
via dedicated ports, and the election process should only run
in those ports. Any election message received from other ports
should be dropped.
E. Scalability
Scalability is an important issue with STP and MAC learn-
ing; every switch must learn all MAC addresses and identifiers
in the network. While easy in small networks, challenges arise
in larger networks such as a large enterprise data center with
many physical servers and virtual machines, each with several
MAC addresses. The number of MAC addresses may exceed
the MAC table capacity of a switch, and increase the delay of
MAC table look ups.
To improve scalability, VLANs may be used to divide a
network into segments, each an isolated L2 broadcast domain.
MAC learning then occurs within a VLAN, reducing MAC
table size. L3 routing is used to connect VLANs.
Another method to improve scalability is to group core
switches into domains called network fabric. In Fig. 4,
switches S5, S6 and ports on switches S1–S4 (customer edge
switches) form a fabric and run an L2 routing protocol,
e.g., Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS) [24],
to learn the fabric network topology. In Fig. 4, a frame
from A to B is encapsulated with an outer header with S1
as source address and S4 as destination address. The outer
header usually introduces TTL to prevent indefinite forwarding
within the fabric. Each customer edge switch learns all local
MAC addresses and some remote MAC addresses; S5 and
S6 learn no end-user MAC address. Example network fabric
implementations are Transparent Interconnection of Lots of
Links (TRILL) [25] and Shortest Path Bridging (SPB)—see
IEEE 802.1aq [26].
Fig. 4: L2 network with network fabric
1) Attacks: VLANs are subject to VLAN hopping attacks—
traffic from one VLAN can be received by another, allowing
L2 attacks against one VLAN to be launched from a differ-
ent VLAN. One attack strategy is VLAN double encapsula-
tion [27]. Another attack strategy is to exploit switch miscon-
figuration or VLAN auto negotiation protocols to impersonate
another switch. In this way, a malicious host can pretend
to be a switch and the link between the host and a switch
would appear to be a trunk link, allowing the host to send
and receive packets with any VLAN tag. Thus, the network
isolation provided by VLAN is completely broken.
There are multiple means for implementing L2 network fab-
ric, e.g., TRILL and SPB, all of which use a routing protocol,
typically IS-IS, to automatically discover and maintain the
network topology inside the fabric. IS-IS is subject to several
attacks, such as PDU spoofing, and DoS due to replaying hello
messages [28], [25].
2) Defenses: VLAN-related vulnerabilities may be miti-
gated by disabling VLAN auto-negotiation, and configuring
VLAN filtering in UNIs. Note that a packet may contain more
than one VLAN tag; all such tags should be filtered if present
in packets received from UNIs.
IS-IS vulnerabilities may be mitigated by enabling addi-
tional IS-IS cryptographic authentication [24], and ignoring
unauthenticated PDUs. Further, IS-IS messages received from
UNIs should be dropped.
V. L3 NETWORKS
A. Basic Forwarding
L3 devices, namely routers, perform two main tasks: route
learning and packet forwarding [29]. In simple networks where
two or more subnets are connected by a single router, the
routing table is usually manually configured without running
any routing protocol. A packet sent from one subnet to another
has a destination MAC address of the default gateway of
the source host, thus always arrives at the router via one
of its interfaces. A router, upon receiving a packet from one
subnet destined to another, performs three actions: removing
the packet’s L2 header, looking up the routing table for the
6next hop, and encapsulating the packet with a new L2 header
for forwarding. A next hop in a routing table could be a
local interface or an IP address. Routing table looking up is
recursive until a next hop is a local interface. In this case, it
further looks up the ARP table associated with that interface
for the MAC address of the packet’s next hop IP address. If
not found, the router uses ARP to obtain the MAC address.
1) Attacks: Since an L3 router uses ARP to resolve the
MAC address of a packet’s destination IP, it is subject to ARP
cache poisoning attacks [30].
2) Defenses: There are several approaches to address ARP
cache poisoning. Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) [31] is a
mechanism by which ARP responses are checked against (1)
a central DB that binds IP to MAC addresses (this may be
populated by listening to DHCP requests and responses in the
network); or (2) static pre-configured ARP entries.
Cryptographic measures can also be used to distribute pre-
populated IP-to-MAC-address mapping attestations, such as
Ticket-based ARP (TARP) [32]. A voting-based protocol,
requiring network consensus before updating ARP entries, has
also been proposed by Nam et al. [33].
B. Loop Free Forwarding
In networks with multiple routers and redundant physical
paths, a routing protocol is often used to advertise and learn
routing information. Routing protocols are either link state
(e.g., IS-IS, OSPF—Open Shortest Path First [1]) or distance
vector (e.g., RIP—Routing Information Protocol [34]).
1) Attacks: While attack methods vary among different
routing protocols, a common attack objective is routing table
poisoning—to pollute network topology information and de-
rived forwarding tables by advertising or injecting false routes
through announcements. For example, a malicious router could
advertise a malicious Link State Advertisement (LSA) (e.g.,
with a false link cost) to influence other routers’ calculation
of routing tables. Such attack is easy to launch but has limited
impact since a neighboring router will eventually advertise a
correct LSA with a fresher sequence number, resulting in the
removal of the falsified LSA from being used for routing table
calculation. More advanced attacks (cf. [35]) can be launched
to increase the effectiveness of routing table poisoning.
2) Defenses: To mitigate routing table poisoning attacks,
three levels of defenses should be considered. First, routing
protocols should only run in NNIs (routing updates received
from UNIs should be dropped). This is to prevent an outsider
(e.g., a host) from participating in routing protocol commu-
nication. Second, message origin authentication should be
implemented to prevent a malicious (compromised, previously
legitimate) router from impersonating another router. Third,
routing updates should be corroborated when being used to
calculate routing tables. For example, a link cost advertised by
one router should be corroborated with the link cost advertised
by the other router on the same link.
C. Link Redundancy
L3 networks usually provide link redundancy through rout-
ing strategies like Equal Cost Multiple Path (ECMP) rout-
ing [36], [37], which allow packets to a common (i.e., the
same) destination address to be routed to their next hops over
multiple links of equal cost. Multiple path routing is a local
decision made within a single router, requiring no interaction
with adjacent or remote routers. Thus, it neither requires
control protocols nor appears to introduce new security risks.
D. Device Redundancy
If a gateway router goes down, traffic across different
subnets will be unable to reach their destinations, result-
ing in service outage. To improve availability, two or more
routers often share a common virtual IP address and run a
control protocol such as Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol
(VRRP) [38] to dynamically elect a master as the default
gateway of a subnet. When a master fails, VRRP dynamically
selects another router as the master. VRRP runs over IP with
an IP multicast address as its destination.
1) Attacks: Protocols for high availability routing such as
VRRP [38] are subject to spoofing attacks. For example,
VRRPv3 [38] does not include authentication of VRRP mes-
sages, thus an attacker may send a spoofed VRRP message
with the highest priority to become the master of the router
cluster. Such an attacker will receive all traffic to and from
a subnet. While the previous versions of VRRP [39], [40] do
include message authentication, it was removed from version 3
because it could be exploited to result in (malicious) election
of multiple masters [38]. It is also argued [38] that other
attacks, such as ARP spoofing, exist which could result in the
same attack effect (e.g., becoming the gateway of end hosts).
2) Defenses: Dropping VRRP messages that arrive from a
host-connected port prevents an attacker sitting at the network
edge from spoofing such messages [38]. Additionally, VRRP
message includes a TTL set to 255 by default. Upon receiving
a VRRP message, a router validates the TTL field and discards
a VRRP message whose TTL is not equal to 255. This limits
the ability of remote attackers (e.g., outside of a network) from
spoofing VRRP packets.
E. Scalability
Within an AS, scalability in L3 networks is provided
using routing protocols, supported by hierarchical routing. For
example, OSPF allows a large network to be divided into sub-
domains (OSPF areas). Routers within an OSPF area need
only maintain network topology information of the area they
belong to. A backbone OSPF area is used to connect all other
areas. Thus routing advertisements are limited to within an
area, reducing the size of routing databases. Between ASes,
BGP is used to advertise network reachability information.
Security risks of routing protocols, and their mitigation, are
discussed in Section V-B above.
VI. SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORKS
In SDN, the control plane of a device is implemented in
an external entity, as opposed to within the device in a CN.
This architectural difference impacts how network properties
from our framework are provided. More specifically, in CNs, a
property achieved in the data plane is also considered achieved
7in the control plane. This does not hold in SDN due to the
separation of planes. Thus for SDN, we discuss separately how
each network property is provided for the data and control
planes. We use OpenFlow switches [41] as an example in our
discussion.
A. Basic Forwarding
Here we consider how a single SDN controller, controlling
a single OpenFlow switch connected with a number of hosts,
learns forwarding information. We assume that the controller
has a direct connection with the switch, thus no need to learn
about this control connection.
To configure the switch to provide connectivity among
connected hosts, the controller must learn the mapping be-
tween hosts (e.g., their MAC addresses) and switch ports. To
do so, the controller may configure the switch to forward
ARP requests and unknown packets, to the controller. An
OpenFlow switch forwards such a packet to a controller using
the PACKET_IN message, which includes the switch port
from which the packet is received. The PACKET_IN message
provides the controller with information about which hosts
connect to which switch ports. If a destination host is also
unknown, the controller instructs the switch to flood this
packet using a PACKET_OUT message. The response from
the destination will also be sent to the controller, allowing the
controller to learn the location of both hosts. As a result, the
controller can set up flow rules for the pair to communicate.
This learning process by a controller, called Host Tracking
Service, is equivalent in principle to MAC learning by an
L2 switch. It demonstrates how a conventional L2 control
function is taken out from a switch, and implemented inside a
controller. One difference is that MAC learning, being L2, only
learns MAC addresses (possibly VLAN IDs). OpenFlow can
learn both L2 addresses (MAC address and possibly VLAN
ID) and IP addresses. We call this process Host Learning, for
better comparability with MAC learning.
1) Attacks: Host learning by a controller, being based on
information provided by a switch and hosts, is thus subject
to spoofing attacks (MAC spoofing, IP spoofing, VLAN tag
spoofing), since a dishonest host or switch can forge such
information inside a packet. Often called Host Location Hi-
jacking [11], here we call it Host Profile Poisoning for better
comparability with MAC table poisoning. Host learning is
also subject to flooding attacks—an attacker may generate a
large number of packets with arbitrary MAC and IP addresses,
resulting in creating (1) a large number of host profiles inside
the controller, (2) a large number of messages sent to the
controller, and (3) a large number of flow tables inside a
switch. Thus, it is possible to cause DoS or packet interception,
as unknown packets are also flooded. For example, if the
memory allocated for host profiles in a controller is full,
an existing host profile (e.g., the oldest) will be overwritten,
resulting in the flooding of a new packet destined to that host.
This resembles an L2 MAC flooding attack.
Host-learning messages between switches and the controller
may be exploited to cause a message forwarding loop.
2) Defenses: MAC binding (discussed earlier) can mitigate
MAC spoofing attacks, albeit requiring static configuration.
MAC limiting (also discussed earlier) can mitigate MAC
flooding attacks, but cannot prevent MAC spoofing.
To mitigate VLAN spoofing, an OpenFlow switch can
designate its ports as UNIs and NNIs, and remove VLAN
tags in packets received from UNIs. Note since there is only
one switch, NNIs will not receive any traffic but the defense
still works in the case of multiple switches. If the port an
SDN controller connects to cannot be determined, and the
controller needs to tag traffic for some reason, this defense
becomes problematic.
To mitigate IP spoofing, OpenFlow controllers could avoid
the learning of IP based forwarding rules from the data plane
by planning IP address assignment and configuring flow tables
with IP prefixes, acknowledging that prefix matching might be
slower than precise matching.
B. Loop Free Forwarding
Here we consider a single controller controlling a number
of OpenFlow switches (Fig. 5).
Fig. 5: An SDN with multiple switches.
To configure forwarding tables on OpenFlow switches, the
controller must first learn the network topology using a control
protocol such as Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) [42].
There are two scenarios to consider. (1) There exists a
dedicated control network (e.g., a direct link between each
switch and the controller) such that each OpenFlow switch can
communicate with the controller, e.g., by establishing a TLS
connection with the controller. (2) No such dedicated control
network exists, and the controller must discover all switches
and set up proper flow tables so they can begin communicating
with the controller to receive further flows.
In case (1), the switch initiates communication with the
controller during a boot-up process. The controller thus obtains
information about individual switches under its control without
running any control protocol. However, the controller does
not know the connectivity between switches, i.e., the network
topology. In case (2), the controller does not know which
switches are under its control and must use a protocol to
discover them (cf. Section 3.3 of [43]). Here we consider
case (1), which is also commonly studied in other papers
(e.g., [11]).
For topology discovery, an OpenFlow controller sends an
LLDP packet (inside a PACKET_OUT message with output
port set to ALL) to every switch under its control. A switch
receiving such a message floods to all of its ports. A switch
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forward it to the controller, e.g., due to the absence of flow
rules for processing such a packet, triggering a default rule for
forwarding unknown packets to the controller, or the existence
of an explicit flow rule for forwarding LLDP packets to the
controller. This PACKET_IN message to the controller also
includes the port number that receives the LLDP packet.
Thus, the controller discovers a link between two switches,
and subsequently all links between all switches, allowing
completion of a complete network topology.
1) Attacks: An OpenFlow controller, discovering network
topology by learning from LLDP packets sent by switches, is
thus subject to LLDP spoofing attacks. An attacker, a switch
or a host, may send falsified LLDP packets to a controller to
contaminate computation of network topology. For example, a
host may send falsified LLDP packets to insert itself and create
non-existent links into the topology. This is a Link Fabrication
Attack [11]. LLDP flooding may also force a controller to
continuously re-calculate network topology, disrupting service.
2) Defenses: To mitigate LLDP spoofing from hosts, an
OpenFlow switch can designate its ports as NNIs and UNIs,
and reject LLDP packets received from UNIs. This defense
would work if the port an SDN controller connects to is
prior known. Otherwise, it will be problematic, since LLDP
packets to and from the controller might also be filtered.
Message authenticity and integrity, if implemented by LLDP,
can effectively mitigate LLDP spoofing by hosts. Consistency
checks of LLDP packets by a controller can mitigate LLDP
spoofing by a host or switch. See Section VII-B for discussion
on how to mitigate attacks from an SDN controller.
C. Link Redundancy
We note two options for implementing link aggregation for
two OpenFlow switches with multiple physical links between
them. (1) The OpenFlow switches, just as an L2 switch, run
LACP between them to create a virtual link presented to the
OpenFlow controller during link discovery. (2) An OpenFlow
controller discovers shared links between two switches and
uses a group table (available in OpenFlow 1.3 and later) to
distribute traffic among a set of switch ports within a group.
Here the OpenFlow controller must monitor the status of all
links and update a corresponding group table upon detection of
a link state change. Note, if an OpenFlow switch shares multi-
ple links with a conventional switch or host running LACP, the
OpenFlow switch can be configured to pass LACPDUs from
the conventional switch to the controller to be processed. We
consider the second case, since a switch implementing LACP
is considered hybrid rather than pure SDN switch.
1) Attacks: An SDN controller is subject to message spoof-
ing attacks. For example, an attacker may send false link up
and down events to a controller, to manipulate the state of a
link group. Such spoofing may be from a switch or host.
2) Defenses: Link state events should only be sent from
OpenFlow switches, not hosts. If the port an SDN controller
connects to is prior known, such events if received from
other UNIs should be dropped. Message authenticity and
integrity, if implemented by OpenFlow events, can effectively
mitigate spoofing by hosts or switches. Consistency checks of
OpenFlow events, if implemented by a controller, can detect
falsified events by a host or switch.
D. Device Redundancy
For redundancy among a group of OpenFlow switches, a
controller could monitor the status of each switch, and update
switch configurations and flow tables accordingly to allow traf-
fic go through a new switch. For redundancy among a group of
OpenFlow controllers, OpenFlow switches are configured with
multiple controllers. When the current controller goes down,
a switch establishes a connection with a next controller. A
distributed election protocol can also be used to elect a master
controller, often for SDN applications. When the master fails,
another slave replica becomes the master. The result of such
master election can also be synchronized into the switch’s
configuration of controller preference to ensure all switches
are also controlled by the same master. For example, ONOS
uses ZooKeeper [44], a tool implementing an election protocol
for distributed coordination and election. OpenDaylight uses
Akka and Raft [45] for master election.
Further, controller states must also remain synchronized
among controllers. For example, ONOS implements an even-
tual consistency model [46], in which a background process
updates written objects in all replicas periodically.
1) Attacks: Beside spoofing attacks against device redun-
dancy (cf. Section VI-C1), an election protocol used by con-
trollers to achieve redundancy is subject to spoofing attacks.
First, a non-controller entity (e.g., a host) may join the election
process to cause undesirable results. Second, a misbehaving
controller may be able to manipulate the master election
process (e.g., by manually picking the smallest allowable time
before candidacy election) to become the next master.
For example, Akka used by OpenDaylight for controller
clustering employs no default security mechanisms [47], e.g.,
for integrity protection of inter-cluster messages. In ONOS,
we note no security mechanisms are used to ensure the
integrity of update information. A timestamp may be forged,
and if replicas are not properly authenticated, an attacker may
impersonate one of them and manipulate stored objects.
2) Defense: If the ports SDN controllers connect to are
prior known, election messages if received from other UNIs
can be be dropped. Otherwise, message origin authentication
and integrity need to be implemented for the election protocol
and state replication, e.g., using mutually authenticated TLS
among controllers, to prevent an outsider from participating
in or tampering with the election process. Additional mecha-
nisms, e.g., information corroboration, are also needed to miti-
gate attacks by a misbehaving controller (e.g., compromised by
an attacker) participating in election with forged information.
E. Scalability
Unlike CNs, which run control protocols such as IS-IS to
implement a network fabric for scalability and other benefits,
OpenFlow controllers can configure flow rules in a way to
improve scalability. For example, an OpenFlow controller may
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warding rules based on outer headers at intermediate switches,
and (3) decapsulation rules at egress switches. In this way,
the controller creates tunnels shared by many individual flows
and the intermediate switches only need to be configured with
the rules related to tunnels, not individual flow, significantly
reducing the number of rules required. Edge switches (ingress
and egress) also only need to be configured with the rules
relevant to the end hosts connected to them. In this way,
OpenFlow controllers may create a network fabric without
need of running additional control protocols.
Scalability in the SDN control plane can be provided by
dividing a network into areas or domains, each controlled
by one or more controllers. Controllers could be peer-to-
peer or hierarchical. In a peer-to-peer model, area controllers
synchronize states among themselves so that each maintains a
consistent global view of the network. In a hierarchical model,
lower level controllers maintain a subset of the global view;
only a top level controller has the global view.
Distributed controllers need to communicate with each other
to exchange reachability and state information. There is cur-
rently no standard defined for inter controller communication.
A distributed protocol is usually needed. For example, BGP
is suggested to be the message exchange protocol among
SDN controllers [48]. ONOS relies on a distributed databases,
e.g., Cassandra [49] and Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs), for
distributing network topology and state information among
controllers.
1) Attacks: Vulnerabilities may arise from distributed com-
munication in a peer-to-peer model, or from controller-to-
controller communication in a hierarchical model. For ex-
ample, if BGP would to be used to exchange information
among controllers, vulnerabilities in BGP could be exploited
to attack SDN. Vulnerabilities could also arise from the
distributed database if it would to be used for synchronization
among controllers. For example, without proper configuration,
Cassandra may be vulnerable to query injection attacks [50].
2) Defense: As with any other distributed protocol such
as an election protocol, communication among controllers,
either peer-to-peer or hierarchical, must provide data origin
authentication and message integrity to prevent outsiders from
participating in or tampering with the communication. Further,
an additional mechanism such as information corroboration
is needed to mitigate misbehavior by legitimate controllers.
Note, unlike in a simple network where the ports to which
controllers connect to can be prior known, it is hard to define a
communication boundary for distributed controllers to prevent
outsiders from participating in the election process.
VII. COMPARISON
Table I summarizes the control functions, attacks and de-
fenses noted above. Here we compare security risks and
defenses of CN and SDN control planes in both the END-
HOST and ALL-ELEMENT threat models of Section III.
A. Basic Forwarding
MAC table poisoning (against a CN switch) and host profile
poisoning (against an SDN controller), the two major threats
respectively, are similar in nature but differ in details. For
example, the attack vector of MAC table poisoning is MAC
address spoofing, while both MAC and IP addresses could be
spoofed in host profile poisoning. Since an L3 router with
manually configured routing table does not learn forwarding
information from the data plane, it is not subject to IP spoofing
attacks. Another subtle difference is related to the size limit
of the MAC table and memory allocated to host profiles when
flooding is employed. MAC table size could vary from a few
thousand to a few million entries, depending on the vendor
and model of a switch; an SDN controller usually has larger
memory and is thus less vulnerable to such flooding.
A CN is also less vulnerable to DoS attack (than an SDN
network) because the SDN controller itself is a new attack
surface, as is the link between a switch and an SDN controller,
which could become a new bottleneck [51].
Defenses for MAC poisoning and host profile poisoning
are similar. For example, port security could be used in
a relatively static network to bind switch ports with MAC
addresses for both CN and SDN. In a dynamic network where
MAC addresses might change often (e.g., in a data center with
server virtualization), static binding is problematic for both
paradigms.
We do not discuss the ALL-ELEMENT threat model here
since this simple network consists of only one switch and
one controller. If the switch or the controller is malicious, the
network would be completely compromised.
B. Loop Free Forwarding
Conventional L2 and L3 networks use STP and routing
protocols (such as OSPF) for loop free forwarding. SDN uses
LLDP for topology discovery.
In the END-HOST threat model, an end host can attack both
CNs and SDN, resulting in incorrect forwarding tables by
exploiting protocols’ vulnerabilities. While the impact from
such attacks appears comparable, attack techniques will differ
since the protocols exploited differ.
Defenses for CNs can rely on UNI filtering. However, that
works in SDN only if the attach points of the SDN controller
are prior known and remain static. Otherwise, UNI filtering
is ineffective and crypto mechanisms are required in SDN to
prevent outsiders from participating in topology discovery.
In the ALL-ELEMENT threat model, the network (e.g., L2 or
L3 device and SDN controller itself) could be malicious; risks
and defenses then appear similar for CNs and SDN, albeit
with subtle differences. From a risk perspective, a malicious
CN device or an SDN controller may be able to compromise
the entire network (e.g., influencing the routing table of any
device within the network), acknowledging that a malicious
SDN controller appears capable of causing more damage.
From a defense perspective, data origin authentication, mes-
sage integrity, and consistency checks are all required by both
CNs and the SDN control plane to counter insider attacks (e.g.,
to detect and discard false information received from other
legitimate nodes). In CNs, consistency checks can be done
inside individual devices. In SDN, consistency checks should
be done by both switches and controller. First, an OpenFlow
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NETWORK PROPERTIES CONVENTIONAL NETWORKS SDNLAYER-2 LAYER-3
Control Functions
Basic Forwarding MAC Learning
Static routes, Address
Resolution Protocol (ARP) Host Location Learning
Loop Free Forwarding Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) Routing Protocols (OSPF, RIP)
Link Layer Discovery Protocol
(LLDP)
Link Redundancy Link Aggregation (LACP)
Equal Cost Multiple Path
(ECMP) Controller
Device Redundancy Switch Stacking
Virtual Router Redundancy
Protocol (VRRP) Election Protocol
Scalability
VLAN, Network fabric
(TRILL, VxLAN)
Routing Protocols (OSPF,
IS-IS) BGP, distributed DB
Attacks
Basic Forwarding
MAC table poisoning (MAC
spoofing and MAC
flooding) [15]
ARP table poisoning [30] Host profile poisoning [11]
Loop Free Forwarding
BPDU spoofing, tampering and
flooding [19], [20]
Routing advertisement
spoofing [35] Link fabrication [11]
Link Redundancy LACPDU spoofing [22] Link DoSing [36]
Spoofed link-manipulation
messages (e.g., [22])
Device Redundancy Stacking spoofing VRRP message spoofing [38] Master election manipulation [47]
Scalability
VLAN hopping [27]; Switch
impersonation [27]; Routing
advertisement spoofing
Routing advertisement
spoofing [35] BGP attacks, distributed DB attacks
Defences
Basic Forwarding
Port Security [17]; MAC
binding and limiting
Dynamic ARP inspection
(DAI) [31]; Ticket-based ARP
(TARP) [32]; Voting-based
protocols [33]
MAC binding, host location
validation [11]
Loop Free Forwarding
Root Guard [21]; BPDU
filtering (prevent a host from
masquerading as a switch)
UNI filtering and consistency
check of routing advertisements
UNI filtering of LLDP
packets [11], Authentication of
LLDP and OFDP packets
Link Redundancy
LACP source port
authentication (data plane
implementation)
N/A
UNI filtering of control messages,
mutual authentication of control
channel
Device Redundancy
Run master election process on
dedicated ports, authenticate
devices involved in the process
UNI filtering of VRRP
messages, TTL checks
Authenticity and integrity in master
election
Scalability
VLAN filtering on UNIs, and
disabling VLAN auto
negotiation
UNI filtering and consistency
check of routing advertisements
Authenticity and integrity in
communication among SDN
controllers
TABLE I: A summary comparison between Conventional Networks (CNs) and SDN.
switch should validate LLDP messages to ensure that it does
not contain false information (e.g., a faked link between the
sender and the receiver). Second, an SDN controller should
validate LLDP messages to rule out faked nodes and faked
links. However, new defenses are needed to mitigate or reduce
risks of a controller misbehaving in doing network topology
discovery and route calculation. It appears difficult to contain
damage from a misbehaving controller if it is monolithic.
Thus, a controller is better divided into small, independent
units to minimize the risk from a misbehaving control unit
and facilitate cross-checking the behavior of each unit.
If adopted for SDN controllers, a micro service architec-
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ture [52] can serve this purpose. As an example of such an
architecture, the control function providing loop free forward-
ing can be implemented in three micro services, the first col-
lecting and validating LLDP messages, the second performing
topology and route calculation, the third updating flow rules
in switches. Each micro service runs multiple instances, each
of which cross-checks requests and responses from multiple
other service instances. To cross-check behavior of flow rule
updating services, other types of services such as real time
flow validation (e.g., VeriFlow [53]) can be implemented.
C. Link Redundancy
A CN uses LACP for link aggregation; an SDN controller
can monitor link state changes, and update link groups in a
switch accordingly. Both are vulnerable to message spoofing
and tampering attacks.
In the END-HOST threat model, rules can be configured on
UNIs to filter LACPDU packets for CNs. If the attach points of
the SDN controller are prior known and static, rules can also be
configured to filter link up/down events for SDN. Otherwise,
crypto mechanisms are required by SDN to prevent outsiders
from sending link up/down events to the SDN controller.
In the ALL-ELEMENT threat model, message origin au-
thentication and message integrity can be used to address a
legitimate switch spoofing a link group member. If a link group
member itself misbehaves, it falls short for the other member
to maintain a correct link group state since the misbehaving
end can manipulate packets (e.g., selectively dropping them)
to achieve the same end.
In SDN, message origin authentication and integrity, e.g., by
mutually authenticated TLS, can mitigate a legitimate switch
spoofing another switch by sending the controller faked link
up and down events. Further, the function controlling link
redundancy can be implemented in micro services, several
running simultaneously to cross-check each others’ behavior.
D. Device Redundancy
Both L2 and L3 use an election protocol to exchange
messages among a device group to elect a master, thus being
subject to spoofing attacks. In SDN, an election need not be
implemented in switches for data plane redundancy, but is
required for controller redundancy.
In the END-HOST threat model, rules can be configured on
NNIs to filter control messages from end hosts. If the attach
points of the SDN controller are prior known and static, such
an approach can also be employed for SDN. Otherwise SDN
requires message origin authentication and message integrity
to counter outsider attacks.
In the ALL-ELEMENT threat model, message origin authen-
tication and message integrity are required to prevent one
legitimate device from impersonating another. An additional
mechanism appears required to detect a legitimate device from
participating in an election using false information. A similar
mechanism appears required in SDN.
E. Scalability
For scalability in CN and SDN, respectively, routing pro-
tocols such as OSPF and BGP can be used. They are subject
to similar attacks. Regarding defenses, the network boundary
can be defined for CN to discard control messages from end
hosts in the END-HOST threat model. In SDN this is less
effective since SDN controllers often run insider servers that
connect to the edge of a network; SDN controllers require
crypto mechanisms to prevent outsiders from participating in
the routing protocols.
In the ALL-ELEMENT threat model, to detect inside attacks,
CNs and SDNs require message origin authentication and
message integrity, as well as consistency checks.
Discussion. We save summary observations for Section IX.
VIII. RELATED WORK
To complement the preceding comparative analysis, we dis-
cuss relevant literature for security in SDN and counterparts in
conventional networks (CNs). Broad surveys of SDN security
are available elsewhere (e.g., [54], [55], [56]).
A. Control Plane
1) Security-oriented controllers: As one of the first network
operating systems, NOX [57] provides greater flexibility to the
management plane. Despite lacking the ability to undertake
most network functionalities by itself, NOX aims to provide
sufficient APIs to ease the fulfilment of such functions. Porras
et al. [12] proposed SE-Floodlight, a security enhanced system
based on Floodlight [58]. Network administrators manually
assign roles to applications, while SE-Floodlight mediates
all OpenFlow operations to enforce a role-based permission
model. SE-Floodlight also provides authentication and flow
conflict resolution services (based on FortNOX [59]), both
occurring on the system level independent of the applications,
to enforce privilege separation (cf. also PermOF [60]). Shin et
al. [61] identified several reasons for controller weaknesses,
including lack of (1) resource control, (2) application sepa-
ration, (3) application authentication and authorship, and (4)
access control, and presented Rosemary as a (non-monolithic)
micro-NOS to address these shortcomings.
2) Control plane security extensions and APIs: Many se-
curity extensions to SDN controllers have been proposed to
monitor and detect suspicious network behavior. VeriFlow [53]
and FlowVisor [62] are two examples. The former provides
real time checking and verification of forwarding behavior,
whereas the latter enables network slicing such that each slice
is typically under a different control domain, thus providing
logical separation of multiple controller instances (cf. [63]).
For such multi-slice networks, FlowChecker [64] is an exam-
ple of a tool that checks consistency across multiple slices.
In contrast to VeriFlow, FlowGuard [65] is a firewall for
SDNs that specifically focuses on conflict resolution. Note that
SE-Floodlight resolves conflicts only between flows, whereas
FlowGuard resolves conflicting network policies in general.
To address the source-binding problem within the network,
FlowTags [66] enables switches to tag packets for appropriate
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source binding, avoiding conflict with middleboxes in the
network. Kim et al. [67] proposed Kinetic to not only monitor
network properties, but also enable administrators to take
appropriate control actions in response to network changes,
and to analyze source of errors in control programs leading
to the undesired network behavior. Similarly, Flover [68] and
NetPlumber [69] are systems to verify that flow policies do
not contradict with desired network security policies.
The proper extent of privileges that should be granted
to an SDN application is unclear. Excessive privileges may
constitute a significant weak point if an application becomes
compromised or is malicious [70]; too few may not allow
sufficient flexibility to run security applications. Fresco [5]
is a framework for developing security SDN applications,
providing APIs for developers to access sensitive network
resources securely. Similarly, OperationCheckpoint [71] aims
to secure the network against third party applications by
ensuring that critical operations can be executed by trusted
applications only.
3) Attack Mitigation: Benton et al. [72] highlight the
importance of isolating applications running on top of the
controller and the importance of verifying flow tables, to avoid
erroneous controllers (including errors introduced without a
malicious intent). Braga et al. [73] showed how machine
learning can be used to identify traffic involved in a DoS at-
tack. BASE [74] was proposed as an anti-spoofing mechanism,
aiming to mitigate DoS. SD-Anti-DDoS [75] is another tool
used to clean bloated flow tables after a DoS attack.
4) Proposals for control plane scalability: To ensure scala-
bility and fault tolerance, numerous proposals advocate repli-
cation and distribution of the control plane [76], [77], [78].
Onix [79] is a prominent example that abstracts the network
distribution state to the control plane running on top. Hy-
perFlow [80] allows multiple separate SDN domains to be
consolidated and controlled from a single point.
B. Data Plane
Despite SDN’s promise to ease management and service de-
ployment, it is becoming clear that not all services can simply
be implemented as applications on the controller. Depending
on required levels of network support, some security solutions
in the literature propose either low-level modules running in
controller kernel space, or software running on switches. These
create challenges in managing/updating network elements, as
is the case with CNs. The OpenFlow Extension Framework
(OFX) [81] leverages control plane centralization to allow
dynamic installation of software on switches.
1) Security services: Distinct from CNs, the centralization
of the control plane in SDNs challenges conventional means
by which gateway services, e.g., firewalls and IDSs, are set
up. For example, instructing edge switches to forward a copy
of the traffic to a separate IDS box would consume substantial
delay and bandwidth [82]. FleXam [83] is an OpenFlow
extension to enable a switch to send sample packets (including
payload) from a specific flow to the controller.
2) Handling compromised switches: Compromising an
SDN switch enables a wide range of MitM and impersonation
attacks [84]; detection in SDN however differs from CNs. Chi
et al. [85] implemented applications that periodically sample
flow rules, and check if a random subset of switches are
behaving as instructed.
3) DoS attacks: While SDN is considered more vulnerable
to DoS attacks [51] than CNs, mitigation techniques appear
to follow non-conventional solutions. For example, Flood-
Guard [86] rate-limits packets sent to the controller to protect
controller bandwidth from being consumed by intentional
PACKET_IN requests from clueless switches. SDNsec [87]
allows edge switches to encode whole routes on each ingress
packet, thus mitigating DoS by state exhaustion. Flow aggre-
gation [88] and flow time-out [89] are also widely regarded
as good practices to mitigate switch memory exhaustion.
4) MitM attacks: Sphinx [13] aims to counter security
threats from within an SDN network (e.g., from network
switches and end hosts) by building flow graphs to represent a
closed form of the network topology, and using these to detect
anomalous switch behavior. Another tool, TopoGuard [11],
aims to detect LLDP hijacking and MitM attacks, by validating
the network view seen by the controller, to mitigate host
location hijacking and link fabrication vulnerabilities.
IX. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Conventional networks and SDN share similar security risks
related to the control plane, but differ in defenses needed. We
observe the following from our analysis in Section VII. In the
END-HOST threat model, conventional networks can define a
network boundary to filter control messages from end hosts.
This approach is less effective in SDN—its control plane is
implemented in SDN controllers, which are usually connected
to the edge of the network; their attaching points, similar to
end host locations, may change unless there is a dedicated
control network separate from user networks. Thus, SDN
largely requires cryptographic protection to prevent outsiders
from participating in the control plane.
In the ALL-ELEMENT threat model (Section III-B), both
conventional networks and SDN require crypto mechanisms,
as well as consistency checks to mitigate insider attacks. They
differ in where and how such checks can be implemented.
While straightforward consistency checks might be imple-
mented within individual CN devices, it is less obvious where
and how to do this in SDN. Our analysis suggests that a highly
modularized and distributed SDN software architecture may
facilitate consistency checks, improving SDN control plane
security (cf. Section VII-B, including for modularization based
on micro service architecture). As noted earlier, current SDN
controllers (e.g., ONOS, Open DayLight) lack mechanisms to
handle insider threats.
Our framework for analysis of control plane security, suit-
able for both conventional networks and SDN, is summarized
by Table I and the discussion in Section VII. It allows an
apples-to-apples comparison, exploring both security risks and
defenses. An objective of our framework and analysis is to
help guide further SDN research, and to aid practitioners in
the design, development, and deployment of software-defined
networks with stronger robustness and security properties.
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Future work includes designing SDN controllers that can
survive in the ALL-ELEMENT threat model, and means for
comprehensive testing of security vulnerabilities and defenses
discussed herein.
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